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Abstract 
 
The ordinary principles of the law of negligence are applicable in the context of sport, including 
claims brought against volunteer and professional coaches. Adopting the perspective of the 
coach, this article intends to raise awareness of the emerging intersection between the law of 
negligence and sports coaching, by utilising an interdisciplinary analysis designed to better 
safeguard and reassure coaches mindful of legal liability.  Detailed scrutiny of two cases 
concerning alleged negligent coaching, with complementary discussion of some of the ethical 
dilemmas facing modern coaches, reinforces the legal duty and obligation of all coaches to adopt 
objectively reasonable and justifiable coaching practices when interacting with athletes.  
Problematically, since research suggests that some coaching practice may be underpinned by 
‘entrenched legitimacy’ and ‘uncritical inertia’, it is argued that coach education and training 
should place a greater emphasis on developing a coach’s  awareness and understanding of the 
evolving legal context in which they discharge the duty of care incumbent upon them. 
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Sports coaching and the law of negligence: implications for coaching practice 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is now well established that the ordinary principles of the law of negligence are 
applicable in the context of sport (e.g. Caldwell v Maguire and Fitzgerald [2001] EWCA Civ 
1054; Griffith-Jones, 2008), including claims brought against volunteer coaches (e.g. Petrou v 
Bertoncello and Others [2012] EWHC 2286; Fowles v Bedfordshire County Council [1996] ELR 
51) and employed coaches (e.g. Anderson v Lyotier [2008] EWHC 2790; Cox v Dundee City 
Council [2014] CSOH 3).   Although it may previously have been regarded as repugnant to 
consider suing a coach for personal injury suffered during an organised sporting activity (Adams, 
Adrian, & Bayless, 1987), not least because of the traditional reliance on volunteer coaches 
operating in a community context (sports coach UK, 2012), this no longer appears the case 
(Wong, 2010).  Indeed, despite the majority of personal injury claims being settled before 
reaching the courts in the UK (Dyson, 2013; Atiyah,1997), there is an emerging body of case law 
listing coaches as defendants (Partington, 2014).  Unsurprisingly, coaches appear increasingly 
concerned about the prospects of legal liability (Greenfield, 2013; McCaskey & Biedzynski, 
1996), with most claims brought against sports coaches for sports related injuries being for 
negligence (Mitten, 2013).   This emerging intersection between the law of negligence and sports 
coaching provides the focus of this article’s interdisciplinary analysis.  More specifically, by 
problematising and critically scrutinising this issue from the perspective of the coach, through 
synthesis of research and case law from the different academic disciplines of law and sports 
coaching, interdisciplinarity (Vick, 2014) is intended to more effectively contextualise and 
deepen awareness of this complexity of modern sports coaching.  Ultimately, it is hoped that this 
article might engender debate regarding the issue of the legal duty of care owed by coaches to 
those under their charge since this represents an important and developing issue that appears 
less-often highlighted in the extant literature. 
 
Although the jurisdictional focus of this article is the UK, since the law of negligence 
may be regarded as generally similar everywhere (Magnus, 2006), the ensuing discussion should 
be of wider interest and relevance.  The article begins by contextualising the issue of coach 
negligence since ‘[i]n law context is everything’ (Regina (Daly) v Secretary of State for the 
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Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532 at [28] per Lord Steyn).  This is followed by a relevant 
overview of the law of negligence revealing the determinative issue, should a coach be sued for 
personal injury suffered by an athlete under their charge, to usually centre on whether or not the 
coach’s actions, conduct or behaviour satisfied the required standard of reasonable skill and care 
ordinarily expected in the same circumstances.  Since this is clearly an issue of coaching 
practice, the article next seeks to problematise coaching practices that may be underpinned by 
‘entrenched legitimacy’ (Cushion & Partington 2014, p. 7), by discussing a number of ethical 
dilemmas facing modern sports coaches, and highlighting the dangers of negligent entrenched 
practice (Partington, 2014).  In further developing and elaborating on some of the potential legal 
vulnerabilies of coaches, two cases concerning alleged negligence by coaches operating in the 
specific circumstances of elite sport are extensively critiqued, with detailed descriptive 
quotations from these judgments intended to provide a useful and constructive insight for 
practising coaches.  Curiously, this case law analysis reveals common sense judicial reasoning, 
likely to be of reassurance to coaches, recognising that coaching behaviour presented by claimant 
athletes as intense, controlling and robust, would not necessarily amount to negligence.  Next, 
the article affirms some important implications for coaches mindful of the emerging spectre of 
legal liability, including the common practice or Bolam ‘defence’ (Partington, 2015b).  
Throughout, a central focus of this article might be regarded as defining the boundary between 
forging champions and committing a tort (Hurst & Knight, 2003), or more precisely, the 
distinction between reasonable and negligent coaching practice.  Since such a determination is 
highly context-specific, it is submitted that superficial reliance on codes of conduct (Hardman & 
Jones, 2013; Telfer, 2010), in developing the awareness of a coach’s legal duties and obligations, 
seems limited.  Accordingly, the article concludes by reinforcing the importance of meaningful 
coach education, training, and further debate and discussion regarding the emerging relationship 
between sports coaching and the law of negligence.   
 
Context 
 
As the principal supervisors of organised sporting activities, coaches must appreciate that 
participation in sport frequently leads to injury (Miles & Tong, 2013).  Accidents can and do 
happen without fault.  However, in circumstances where sporting injury was caused by negligent 
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coaching, legal liability may eventuate.  The interpersonal relationship between coaches and 
athletes creates the capacity for a lack of ‘empathy with or care and concern for the wellbeing of 
the other person’ (Lyle, 1999, p. 43). Since the negligence standard is premised on reasonable 
care, or ‘culpable carelessness’ (Hartley, 2009, p. 44), the emerging interface between sports 
coaching and the tort of negligence is a significant complexity of modern coaching that cannot 
be ignored and must be addressed in an informed and proportionate manner.  For instance, at the 
elite level, coaches are exposed to increasing demands to deliver ‘cutting edge’ guidance and 
advice to athletes (Mallett, 2010), potentially challenging the fine line between harm and 
reasonable endeavor when pushing the human body to its physical and emotional limits within 
training and performance (Telfer, 2010).  Greater emphasis is now placed on coaches to regulate 
the volume and intensity of training loads (Miles & Tong, 2013), this article’s subsequent case 
law analysis revealing this to have been a material consideration before the court in Davenport v 
Farrow [2010] EWHC 550.   
 
More generally, some coaches may seek to gain any ‘edge’ possible when conforming to 
the ‘win at all costs’ mentality frequently prevalent in a range of competitive sports (Jamieson & 
Orr, 2009).  This is reflective of what might be termed the ‘sport ethic’, with over-conformity to 
this ideology reinforcing the acceptance of unreasonable risks by both coaches and athletes, as 
evidenced by an over-emphasis on the pursuit of winning and a refusal to accept appropriate and 
necessary limitations (Young, 2012).  Many admired and respected coaches are arguably held in 
such high regard because of this notable commitment and insistence on an excessive ‘win-at-all-
costs’ ethos (Young, 1993).  Alexander, Stafford and Lewis (2011) indicate that young athletes 
may ‘accept a culture where training through discomfort, injury and exhaustion is seen as 
normal’ (p. 14), it being suggested that some coaches encourage athletes, or ‘guilt’ them, into 
continuing to participate in these same circumstances in order to avoid letting teammates down.  
Accordingly, Coakley and Pike (2014, p. 160) suggest that coaches may: 
 
take great care to control deviant underconformity, but they often ignore or encourage 
overconformity, even though it may lead to injuries and have long-term negative 
implications for the health and well-being of athletes.  Therefore, in the culture of high-
performance sports, these norms are accepted uncritically, without question or 
qualification, and often followed without recognizing limits or thinking about the 
boundaries that separate normal from deviant. 
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Similarly, it has been suggested that ‘[w]inning coaches often achieve results through 
techniques that could legally be considered “wanton” or “grossly negligent” in any other context’ 
(Hurst & Knight, 2003, p. 28).   Although probably more prevalent in elite performance sport, 
which will provide the circumstances for this article’s case law analysis, these excesses of 
coaching behavior may not be confined to high level competitive sport since this culture of 
control and authoritarianism appears deeply embedded, even at the lower levels of the sports 
performance pyramid (Cassidy, Jones, & Potrac, 2009).  For instance, reputation and kudos at 
the amateur level may facilitate adoption by coaches of high-risk practices with the potential to 
cause physical harm (Young, 2004), it being assumed that some coaches at the non-professional 
level appear unsympathetic to athletes complaining of being injured (Pike & Scott, 2015; Young 
& White, 1999).  At the elite level, there is also evidence to indicate that soccer coaching 
behaviours can often be belligerent, reflective of the culture in professional soccer, preparation 
for the rigours of the game regarded as requiring young players to be exposed to harsh and 
authoritarian approaches to coaching (Cushion & Jones, 2006; Williams & Hodges, 2005).  In 
short, contextualisation of modern sports coaching clearly illustrates the scope for potential legal 
vulnerability, or ‘culpable carelessness’, and more specifically, the need for all coaches to have 
regard to the somewhat elusive and nebulous boundary between optimising performance or 
acting negligently.  Importantly, should courts be tasked with defining this distinction, 
application of ordinary principles from the law of negligence would usually expose the coaching 
practices adopted to robust and searching judicial scrutiny. 
 
Law of Negligence 
 
A sports coach may be found legally liable in negligence in the UK where it can be 
established by the claimant (athlete) that the defendant (coach): (i) owed the athlete a duty of 
care (duty); (ii) that this duty of care was breached (breach/fault); and, (iii) the breach in 
question caused foreseeable personal injury to the athlete (causation).  Since the tort of 
negligence is underpinned by the ‘neighbour principle’ (Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562), 
requiring the exercise of reasonable care to avoid injuring anyone who ought reasonably to be 
considered as being affected by one’s actions or omissions,  it is immediately apparent that 
coaches must display reasonable care when assuming such a role (Beloff et al., 2012; Griffith-
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Jones, 2008; James, 2013).  Given the supervisory, instructional and safety functions of a coach, 
arguably providing the foundation of the coach-athlete relationship, it is just, fair and reasonable 
(Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605), and indeed well-settled law, that coaches owe a duty of 
care to athletes (e.g., Fowles v Bedfordshire County Council [1996] ELR 51; Anderson v Lyotier 
[2008] EWHC 2790; Morrow v Dungannon and South Tyrone Borough Council [2012] NIQB 
50).  Accordingly, the law of negligence’s control mechanism of duty, in the context of sports 
coaching, would tend to be straightforwardly satisfied by athlete claimants. 
 
Before turning to the usually determinative issue of breach of duty, the second of the 
aforementioned control devices typically posing little difficulty to establish for claimants would 
appear to be causation.  Since establishing both causation in fact (Barnett  v Chelsea and 
Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428), and legal causation (Overseas 
Tankship v Morts Docks & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound No. 1) [1961] AC 388) is 
generally unambiguous for participant liability (James, 2013), in the main, it is contended that 
causation inquiries for cases of alleged coach negligence should also tend normally to be 
uncomplicated (e.g., Cox v Dundee City Council [2014] CSOH 3, Woodroffe-Hedley v 
Cuthbertson, Unreported, 20 June 1997). Consequently, proceeding on the premise that firstly, a 
sports coach owes a duty of care to those under their charge, and secondly, that establishing 
causation would typically not appear problematic in this context, should a claim be brought 
against a sports coach for alleged negligence, the decisive factor would most probably be 
whether the coach fulfilled the duty to exercise reasonable care for the protection of the 
performer (Labuschagne & Skea, 1999).  Simply applied, the pivotal issue in coach negligence 
cases concerns the standard of skill and care incumbent on the defendant coach (Partington, 
2014, 2015b; Kevan, 2005),  or the tort of negligence’s control mechanism of breach, this being 
informed and moulded by the full factual context and circumstances in which the defendant 
sports coach was operating (Griffith-Jones, 2007; James, 2013).  
 
More precisely, a finding of liability in negligence would involve establishing that the 
sports coach’s conduct had fallen below the required objective standard ascertained by the court 
(Nettleship v Weston [1971[ 2 QB 691), in guarding against reasonably foreseeable risk 
(Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Co (The Wagon Mound No. 2) [1967] 1 
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AC 617), in the specific circumstances (e.g., Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850; section 1 of the 
Compensation Act 2006; Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015; see further, 
Partington, 2015a). This benchmark of objective reasonableness is defined to safeguard the 
legitimate and genuine right of athletes not to be exposed to unreasonable risks, but crucially, 
providing coaches discharge and meet this standard of skill and care, there can be no liability in 
negligence.  However, since coaching practice is complex and highly situation-dependent, the 
distinction between reasonable and negligent coaching conduct remains somewhat elusive and 
imprecise (Hardman & Jones, 2011; Partington, 2014). This is compounded by the essentially 
vague and woolly nature of reasonableness as a legal test which fails to provide much by way of 
guidance when attempts are made to define the standard of care (Clancy, 1995).  Since this 
benchmark is strikingly fact sensitive (Norris, 2009),  although judicial clarification of the level 
of due care necessary to avoid breaching the duty of care owed to athletes would be 
advantageous by providing a transparent illustration for coaches (Fulbrook, 2005), this seems 
improbable.  This reinforces the importance of coach education provision developing coaches’ 
‘socially informed decision-making skills’ (Jones, 2000, p. 34), as this might more effectively 
encourage and support coaches in unpacking and clarifying ‘reasonableness’ in the varying and 
specific contexts in which they function.  
 
Crucially, any practice requiring special skill, knowledge or experience, including the 
coaching of sport (Fowles v Bedfordshire County Council [1996] ELR 51;  Davenport v Farrow 
[2010] EWHC 550),  requires a higher standard of care to be displayed than would be expected 
of the ordinary reasonable person (Lunney & Oliphant, 2013; Jones & Dugdale, 2010).  Put 
simply, the standard of skill and care exercised by coaches should be consistent with that 
expected of the ordinarily competent coach in the same circumstances.  Interestingly, in being 
mindful of the wider professionalisation of sports coaching agenda, this legal test recognises the 
enhanced difficulty and skill in the working practices of professionals (Mangan, 2014), with the 
imposition of this legal obligation or duty of care often regarded as ‘a badge of professional 
status’ (D v East Berkshire Community Health Authority [2005] 2 AC 373 at [40] per Lord 
Bingham).  Nonetheless, these same legal principles would also appear to be applicable to 
individuals not regarded as being members of a profession but whose functions demand the 
exercise of a special skill (Lunney & Oliphant, 2013). Further, whether or not the coach may 
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have some formal recognition of their specialisation would appear immaterial (Powell and 
Stewart, 2012), as would classification as amateur or professional (Gardiner, 1993), the standard 
required remaining appropriate to specialists operating at the same level in that designated field.  
Somewhat paradoxically, given the predominant reliance on volunteer coaches in the UK, this 
means that on occasions courts would appear to be tasked with essentially determining what 
might be termed the ‘professional liability of amateurs’ (Partington, 2015b & 2016).   
 
Moreover, this would not appear to be a static legal test, since as the principles of 
coaching are constantly assessed and revised (Trudel, Gilbert & Werthner, 2010; Cassidy et al., 
2009; Taylor & Garratt, 2010), so too is the likely legal standard of care required of coaches 
(Powell & Stewart, 2012).  Further, as performers progress to elite and excellence levels the 
required emphasis on more specialised training programmes creates new risks requiring coaches 
to ensure that they possess the necessary competence and expertise to operate safely in these 
amended circumstances (Labuschagne & Skea, 1999).  This acknowledges the importance of 
continuing ‘professional’ development, coach education and training for all coaches.  
Correspondingly, coaches have an obligation to ensure that their level of competence (i.e., 
qualifications, training and/or experience) is commensurate to the performance level at which 
they are coaching, since any possible skills gap (see for instance, Lynn & Lyle, 2010; Lyle & 
Cushion, 2010) may expose athletes to unreasonable risk, thereby heightening the coach’s 
exposure to legal liability in negligence.   
 
In seeking to raise awareness and facilitate debate concerning some of the implications 
for coaches derived from the interaction between the law of negligence and sports coaching, this 
article next seeks to problematise this issue and highlight a number of ethical dilemmas facing 
modern sports coaches.  This should prove both instructive and insightful since fulfilment of the 
legal duty of discharging reasonable care may be regarded as consistent with the ethical 
obligation not to expose athletes to unreasonable risks of injury (Mitten, 2013). For instance, an 
important relevant dilemma, which is subsequently exposed to fuller analysis by scrutinising 
related case law from the context of elite sport (Brady v Sunderland Association Football Club 
Limited and Others (Unreported, 2 April, 1998 Queen’s Bench Division); Davenport v Farrow 
[2010] EWHC 550), concerns decisions by coaches on ‘how hard to “push”’ athletes in order to 
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optimise performance and gain a competitive ‘edge’.  This often fine line appears particularly 
acute when coaches might perceive a lack of commitment, or ‘attitude problem’, on behalf of the 
athlete(s) being coached.  As the following case law analysis reveals, viewed from the 
contrasting perspective of the athlete, intense and demanding coaching behaviour may 
sometimes be regarded as too authoritarian, inappropriate, oppressive and controlling.  Since the 
legal requirement is for coaching practice to be objectively reasonable, both the perspective of 
the coach and injured athlete, supported by additional relevant evidence, including 
complementary expert witness testimony, would likely inform the court’s deliberations when 
tasked with determining the boundary between reasonable or negligent coaching. 
 
 
Coaching Practice 
 
The pivotal issue should a coach be sued in negligence concerns whether or not the 
coach’s actions, conduct or behaviour satisfied the required standard of reasonable skill and care, 
as defined by the court, after taking full account of the unique circumstances of the case.  This 
obligation encompasses both acts and omissions (ie., negligent instruction and inadequate 
supervision).  In the context of sports coaching, this would appear to relate to coaching practices 
that have an explicit impact on the athlete, most typically, direct coaching interventions and 
interactions in the particular circumstances of training, practices, competitions and fixtures. 
Simply applied, coaches have a legal responsibility to ensure that the coaching practices adopted 
and employed are reasonable. 
 
Much contemporary coaching practice appears to be underpinned by emulation, intuition 
and tradition, or ‘uncritical inertia’ (Partington & Cushion, 2013; Williams & Hodges, 2005; 
Ehrmann, 2011).  This may ‘authenticate certain types of collective knowledge with the resulting 
discourse giving certain practices an entrenched legitimacy’ (Cushion & Partington 2014, p. 7).  
Problematically, in circumstances where this entrenched legitimacy exposes athletes to 
unreasonable risk of injury, coaches may inadvertently be exposed to liability in negligence as a 
result of negligent entrenched practice (Partington, 2014). For instance, it is comprehensible that 
coaches working in the context of elite sport, seeking to optimise the performance levels of the 
athletes by repeatedly pushing players to the limit of their physical and mental performance 
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thresholds, may be reluctant to take extra (reasonable) precautions in practice (Lines, 2007).  
This feasible scenario illustrates the need for coaches to have the prerequisite self-awareness to 
understand both the positive and negative implications of their behavior (Cushion, 2010).  
Nonetheless, since research indicates that coaches may demonstrate low self-awareness about 
their coaching practice and behaviour (Partington & Cushion, 2013; Harvey, Cushion, Cope & 
Muir, 2013; Cushion, 2010), the reasonableness of demands made of athletes by coaches may 
not always be sufficiently appraised, evaluated and reflected upon.  The fact coaching 
practitioners often operate in isolation (Trudel, Gilbert & Werthner, 2010), likely restricting 
opportunities for critically constructive and informed discussion, and the sharing of best practice, 
probably compounds the capacity for negligent entrenched coaching methods to be incorporated 
into coaching practice unwittingly and without question. 
 
Arguably, authoritative and oppressive interaction between coaches and players, and 
possible implementation of punishment type drills and practices, may become regarded as 
routine and acceptable in certain circumstances (Kellett, 2002; Ehrmann, 2011).  Take for 
example, some of the conditioning/punishment type drills modelled and reinforced, and 
portrayed as necessary and effective coaching practice, in contemporary films including Coach 
Carter, Remember the Titans and Best Shot. This includes a high intensity shuttle-sprint training 
drill, commonly referred to as ‘suicides’.  While many coaches will, no doubt, utilise such 
methods reasonably, as this article’s legal analysis reveals, coaches must be cautious when using 
exercise drills as a form of punishment (Wong, 2010).  In fact, consideration of this particular 
coaching practice through this article’s interdisciplinary lens, and being mindful of better 
safeguarding coaches from litigation risk,  appears to problematise the label ‘suicide’ drill.  In 
advocating the avoidance of such terminology by coaches, Appenzeller (2011) notes that this and 
similar such terms ‘could come back to haunt you in court should an injury occur’ (p. 153). Put 
bluntly, it may be particularly challenging for coaches engaging in such coaching methods as a 
matter of habit, routine, or uncritical inertia, to justify such practice as being objectively 
reasonable. This is submitted to be a possible scenario where there would appear to be the 
potential for possible negligent entrenched practice to be ‘accepted uncritically, without question 
or qualification, and often followed without recognizing limits or thinking about the boundaries 
that separate normal from deviant’ (Coakley & Pike, 2014, p. 160).   
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A significant ethical dilemma facing modern sports coaches, not least when working with 
young athletes, concerns determination of training intensity levels (see, for instance, Miles & 
Tong, 2013; Lyle, 2002).  As will be highlighted in the later case law analysis, insightful and 
instructive judicial comments on this important issue were made by Mr Justice Owen in 
Davenport v Farrow [2010] EWHC 550.  For present purposes, it is important to note that this is 
generally a judgment call left to the discretion of individual coaches based on the specific 
circumstances.  In short, this is an area where coaches have to be trusted to make the right (or 
reasonable) decisions (Cassidy et al 2009).   
According to	Martínková & Parry (2011, p. 177-78):  
The dangers of over-training and inappropriate methods have long been recognized, as 
have the duties of the coach to be knowledgeable and well informed, to take care over the 
appropriate design of training session schedules, and to monitor athletes for signs of 
weariness and distress.   
In terms of effective coaching practice, Cross & Lyle (1999, p.192) continue:  
coaches have a responsibility to implement a coaching process, especially with elite and 
high-level performance athletes, which is comprehensively planned, adequately and 
frequently monitored and in which, through careful regulation of the training loading 
factors, the athlete’s progress and wellbeing are constantly emphasised in order to avoid 
‘overtraining’.   
Yet, despite the long recognition of the risks posed to athletes by overtraining and inappropriate 
training methods and practices, research would suggest that excessive training, both in terms of 
the intensity and duration of sessions, remains a concern (Alexander, Stafford & Lewis, 2011).   
More positively, in view of the dynamic environment in which coaches operate, the law 
recognises that there may be a number of perfectly proper standards or practices (Bolam v Friern 
Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582; Montrose, 1958), providing the coaching 
decisions made were ‘within a reasonable range of options’ (Woodbridge School v Chittock 
[2002] EWCA Civ 915; Davenport v Farrow [2010] EWHC 550 at [59]).  Since sports coaching  
‘consists of a continua of highly complex, context-dependent and historically situated 
behaviours’ (Hardman & Jones, 2011, p. 78), courts tasked with determining a coach negligence 
case would be able to recognise that no ‘transparent, fixed and universally accepted boundary 
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[exisits] between appropriate and inappropriate coaching conduct’ (Hardman & Jones, 2011, p. 
78).  Consistent with the previously highlighted uncertainty generated from a test premised on 
reasonableness, this would, therefore, seem to advocate the relevance and necessity for further 
discussion of ethical dilemmas drawn from practical coaching scenarios in order to support 
coaches in developing reasonable and effective coaching practices (see, generally, Cassidy et al 
2009). 
The following detailed analysis of two cases, from the context of elite sport, provides an 
important and interesting insight regarding judicial scrutiny of the coaching practices and 
behaviors adopted in the particular circumstances should a coach be sued for alleged negligence.   
 
Case law analysis 
 
Brady v Sunderland Association Football Club Limited and Others (Unreported, 2 April, 
1998 Queen’s Bench Division)  
 
Facts 
 
The claimant/plaintiff, was a highly promising young footballer, having played for the 
Sunderland First Team and the Republic of Ireland Under-21 and Youth Teams.  Due to a likely 
vascular problem in his right leg, and despite several operations, he was unable to pursue his 
career as a professional footballer.  For present purposes, the action brought by the claimant 
essentially amounted to an allegation that the club had breached its duty of care owed to him by 
failing to properly heed or investigate obvious physical problems and/or complaints, with a 
subsequent failure to refer him to a doctor.  It was alleged on behalf of the claimant that 
complaints by the player, and apparent difficulties in training, were attributed to an attitude 
problem and that any referral to a doctor would have led to a diagnosis of possible vascular 
problems which would have been investigated at a time when treatment would have been 
successful.  Though ultimately unsuccessful, despite the case also being heard by the Court of 
Appeal, detailed examination of the judgment from the perspective of a coach provides an 
important insight regarding the likely scrutiny by courts of the conduct of coaches should a 
coach be sued in negligence. 
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Analysis 
 
The duty of a coach is to exercise reasonable skill and care to ensure that those under the 
coach’s charge are not exposed to unreasonable or unacceptable risk in the particular 
circumstances.  Although the standard expected of sports coaches is fixed conceptually as the 
duty to take reasonable care, specific duties required of coaches have evolved (McCaskey & 
Biedzynski, 1996), with Barnes (1996) suggesting that coaches are required to discharge 
responsibilities that may be classified under three main headings which include: facilities and 
organisation; instruction and supervision; and medical care (see, further, Anderson, 2010; Beloff 
et al., 2012; Cox & Schuster, 2004).  According to Martens (2004), the medical responsibilities 
of a coach  include making sure that the athlete’s health is satisfactory prior to participation; 
determining when an athlete’s illness or injury should prevent further participation; and, only 
permitting athletes to return to active participation when it is safe to do so.  Significantly, in 
Brady v Sunderland Association Football Club, when assessing the reasonableness of the Club’s 
actions, and more specifically, the behaviour of the manager/coach, these were material 
considerations for the court.  Subsequently, given the particular facts of this case, the 
reasonableness of the instruction, supervision and referral to the club’s physiotherapist for 
medical attention, by the coach/manger, was a pivotal matter in determining the outcome of the 
trial.  As succinctly put by the judge, Mr Justice Buckley: 
 
the real issues are whether the plaintiff complained of, as opposed to experienced, 
symptoms which should have led to an earlier referral to [the Club’s honorary Doctor] or 
whether the Club, through [the Club’s physiotherapist] or the manager … should 
otherwise have spotted them and made such a referral. 
 
In prioritising the perspective of the manager/coach, and consistent with this article’s 
objectives of providing a detailed insight, and greater awareness, of the scope for civil liability, 
interesting aspects of the claimant’s submissions when seeking to make out the allegation of 
negligence included: 
 
• During a training run, after complaining of severe pain in his calf to the manager, the 
claimant was told to keep running with the other players, the manager/coach saying he 
didn’t care what the claimant had and that he could see the physiotherapist after training. 
 
• The coach was repeatedly telling the claimant that he had an attitude problem, 
particularly in relation to training. 
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• When referring to a six mile run completed at a later date, in his witness statement, the 
claimant stated that the manager ‘told me that he wasn’t going to put up with any more 
nonsense.  He told me that I couldn’t stop and to keep going.  He then sent the other 
players off in a different direction and he ran with me along the coast lecturing me about 
my attitude and telling me I just didn’t like hard work.  At the end of the run he told me I 
could go to see the physiotherapist’. 
 
While finding the claimant to be an honest witness, the court acknowledged the difficulty faced 
by him in recalling details from almost six years prior to the hearing of the case.  Further, the 
transient nature of the claimant’s injury, combined with the admission that he did not like 
training without the ball, persuaded Buckley J that it had been understandable and reasonable for 
the manager to conclude that the claimant had an attitude problem.  On this issue, the High 
Court’s judgment concludes, 
 
[The manager/coach] agreed he did not like the plaintiff’s attitude at times.  He said he 
was a talented player, but one who needed to work harder.  He was fine with the ball but 
not without it was how he described him.  He felt the plaintiff did not work hard at 
stamina running or with weights and had a poor attitude to hard training generally.  There 
is a measure of common ground here because the plaintiff was conscious that [the 
manager/coach] felt he had an attitude problem and he accepted he didn’t like stamina 
training and preferred training with the ball.  He was disenchanted with the coaching 
staff. 
 
Crucially, the judgment of Buckley J at first instance, quite correctly, makes plain that, 
‘[e]ven if [the manager’s] attitude at the time was robust – and it probably was – in all the 
circumstances, that does not begin to amount to negligence’.  Employing this article’s scrutiny of 
appropriate coaching practice, the autocratic and authoritarian coaching style, perhaps prevalent 
within the culture in professional soccer (Cushion & Jones, 2006), and allegedly adopted by this 
manager/coach, was regarded by the court to have been reasonable in the circumstances of 
professional football at that time.  Ultimately, the claims of a breach of duty of care by the Club, 
and its agents (including the manager/coach and physiotherapist), failed.  Nonetheless, reflecting 
more widely on Brady v Sunderland Association Football Club, although not established on the 
particular facts of this individual case, it becomes clear that causes of action that may be brought 
against coaches might be founded on:  negligent supervision and/or instruction; ineffective 
provision of medical care/referral; pressuring injured players to perform; and, failure to ensure 
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that the intensity of training sessions and practices is within reasonable parameters of acceptable 
coaching. 
 
The recent case of Davenport v Farrow provides a further, and fuller, detailed illustration 
and unpacking of these specific duties owed by coaches to athletes under their charge. 
 
Davenport v Farrow [2010] EWHC 550 
 
Facts  
 
The defendant coach in this case was extremely successful, holding the highest level of 
formal qualification accredited by UK Athletics.  The claimant was an athlete of world class 
potential, having broken the UK Junior record for the 400 metre hurdles at the World Junior 
Championships in 2004.  The claimant’s case, somewhat consistent with that argued by counsel 
in Brady v Sunderland Association Football Club, alleged that he sustained stress fractures in 
October/November 2004, causing significant pain which affected his ability to train, and which 
he drew to the attention of his coach.  However, it was contended by the athlete that his coach 
ignored these complaints, dismissing them as symptomatic of a lack of motivation on the part of 
the claimant.  Subsequently, it was submitted that in breach of his duties to the claimant, whether 
contractual or tortious, the defendant coach failed to take the complaints seriously, assuring the 
claimant that there was nothing wrong with him.  It was further asserted that the coach ought to 
have advised the claimant to have the condition investigated, and that had an investigation then 
taken place, the stress fractures would have been treated conservatively with rest, and that, on the 
balance of probabilities, they would have united satisfactorily without surgical intervention.  In 
short, the court was of the view that the claimant’s case depended upon when the stress fractures 
occurred, since if the fractures pre-dated October/November 2004, then there could be no causal 
relationship between the alleged failure on the part of the defendant coach to respond to the 
claimant’s complaints of back pain during the relevant period, and the injury, loss and damage 
for which the claimant contended.  Consistent with the theme of this article, it is the scrutiny of 
the coach’s conduct by the court, in light of admissions by the claimant, which will provide the 
main focus of the following analysis. 
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Analysis 
 
Importantly, both sides in this case called other athletes trained by the defendant coach to 
provide evidence.  One such athlete, ‘EP’, recalled how the defendant ‘was continually on about 
the fact that [the claimant] was lazy and that there was nothing wrong with him’ (Davenport v 
Farrow [2010] EWHC 550 at [23] per Owen J).  Crucially, in highlighting the potential 
significance of the specific circumstances of the case, including the coaching style adopted by 
defendant coach, Owen J recognised: 
 
There is a further aspect of the evidence that bears on the issue.  The claimant contends 
that the defendant was a forceful and controlling personality who demanded a high level 
of control over young athletes whom he coached.  He gave evidence that the defendant 
wanted a say in all aspects of his life.  The defendant would telephone on an almost daily 
basis, and would question his mother about what she was feeding him, wanting to control 
his diet (at [27]). 
 
This evidence regarding the authoritarian practice employed by the defendant coach was further 
supported by the evidence of ‘EP’, who elaborated: 
 
Looking back at my time with [the defendant coach], I had not realized how controlling 
[he] was over his athletes.  With hindsight, he was incredibly controlling.  He controlled 
everything.  [He] told me what I could eat, he insisted that I weigh my food so I just got 
enough.  He said that if I went to bed hungry then I would burn more fat whilst I slept 
and keep my weight down (at [28]). 
 
Arguably, a more objective assessment of the defendant’s approach to coaching, or coaching 
practice, was provided during the court hearing by the then Director of Coaching for Track and 
Field Events at Loughborough University: 
 
Knowing [the coach], he is pretty steadfast in his views on how someone should be 
coached and is not someone who readily listens to someone else’s views.  He is also 
controlling in the way in which he handles his athletes and he dictates how things are 
done.  Younger athletes will tend to accept what their coach tells them in terms of how 
they train and what treatment they need and I can understand when [the claimant] says he 
accepted [his coach’s] advice on things (at [30]). 
 
Cases brought in negligence are always highly fact sensitive (Norris, 2010) and 
dependent upon the particular circumstances of each individual case. Interestingly, in another 
sports negligence case, Caldwell v Maguire, Judge LJ reiterated in the Court of Appeal that ‘the 
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issue of negligence cannot be resolved in a vacuum.  It is fact specific’ (Caldwell v. Maguire and 
Fitzgerald [2001] EWCA Civ. 1054 at [30]).  Accordingly, in Davenport v Farrow, the 
defendant coach’s relationship with the athletes that he trained, and more specifically, the 
coach’s behaviour and practice, contextualised for the court assessment of the claimant’s 
submissions in relation to his back pain.  A further corresponding matter relating to both 
Davenport v Farrow, and Brady v Sunderland Association Football Club, and likely to be of 
some relevance in future cases, concerns what coaches frequently term an ‘attitude problem’ of 
the athlete(s) being coached.  On this, the judgment of the court in Davenport v Farrow found: 
 
Secondly the evidence as to the nature of their relationship is relevant in that the claimant 
contends that it provides an explanation as to why his complaints were ignored by the 
defendant.  The evidence shows clearly that from December 2004 until they parted 
company, the defendant considered that the claimant lacked motivation and had an 
attitude problem (at [32]). 
 
Owen J continued, 
 
The claimant gave evidence that he thought that the defendant believed that the problem 
that he was reporting with his back was just an attempt to get out of training.  [‘EP’] 
recalled the defendant saying continually at this time that the claimant was lazy and that 
there was nothing wrong with him.  [‘LP’, another athlete] gave evidence that if you were 
someone who was lazy and lacked credibility, then any aches and pains would be met by 
the defendant with some cynicism (at [35]). 
 
While it may be reasonable for coaches, on occasions, to become frustrated with athletes 
due to a lack of commitment, hard work and intensity, the court’s attention concentrates on how 
an ordinarily reasonable coach in the same circumstances would behave.  Crucially, this is an 
objective test of reasonableness which would not reflect the subjective idiosyncratic personal 
tendencies, for instance, possible excessive cynicism, of individual coaches.  Simply applied, the 
negligence standard demands that defining the boundary between what might amount to 
appropriate coaching behaviour, as opposed to pushing athletes too hard, is a question of what is 
objectively reasonable, and justifiable, in the same circumstances.  Consequently, a further 
contemporaneous source of information considered by the court in Davenport v Farrow, and 
likely to be instructive and informative for all coaches, was a screening report, compiled as part 
of a programme of regular screening, due to the fact that the claimant had been enlisted in the 
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UK Athletics programme for athletes with world class potential.  This ‘SW Potential athlete 
report’ contained the following statement on the claimant: 
 
From discussion with [the defendant coach] and feedback from Darcy appears training 
programme is all in place.  However, concerns over controlling nature of relationship 
between coach and athletes … and strong possibility that athletes are being pushed too 
hard too early.  Prevalence of injuries in whole group suggests this may be case (at [41]). 
 
Significantly, critical scrutiny of the judicial reasoning from both of these cases, and 
consideration of the material facts presented to the court, reinforces the necessity for coaching 
practice to be appropriate and commensurate to the specific circumstances in which the athlete is 
performing.  This reinforces the good practice of coaches critically reflecting upon the suitability 
and appropriateness of their coaching behaviours, thereby ensuring that the coaching methods 
employed are rigorously justifiable.  In this regard, should a coach be sued, the court would 
likely be able to peruse expert witness testimony when seeking to define what might amount to 
reasonable coaching practice in the same circumstances.  For instance, in ultimately dismissing 
the claim against the defendant coach, the High Court concluded: 
    
 [the claimant’s] case was advanced upon the basis that the probable cause of an acute 
spondyloyses was a marked increase in the intensity of his training from September 2004. 
There was an increase in the number of sessions as the Claimant had begun training on a 
full time basis; but I accept the evidence of the Defendant, given by reference to his 
training programmes for the Claimant, that it was a moderate increase from the same 
period in the previous year, and was not therefore significantly more than he had done in 
the past. It is also to be noted that in this context that in their joint statement, the coaching 
experts whose reports were before the court, agreed that the regime undertaken in 2004-
2005, based on the Defendant's training log, was within the range of acceptable coaching 
(level 4) for an athlete of his ability and aspirations. I am not persuaded that there was a 
change in the level and intensity of training in September 2004 such as to provide an 
explanation for the development of spondyloyses (at [59] per Owen J). 
 
Some implications 
 
The above interdisciplinary analysis of both Brady v Sunderland Association Football 
Club, and Davenport v Farrow, confirms that overtraining, or training requiring an unreasonable 
level of intensity, may provide the foundation for a cause of action in negligence.  Further, 
coaches must be mindful to avoid exerting undue pressure or influence on players returning from 
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injury, in addition to discharging responsibilities regarding appropriate medical care of athletes, 
including pertinent referral to relevant specialist medical practitioners and adherence to 
stipulated protocols.   Also, the searching inquiries conducted by the court reinforces the need for 
coaches to keep written records of such things as training sessions delivered, schedules of 
training programmes, attendance registers, injuries sustained by participants, performance and 
fitness assessments (Barnes, 1996; Whitlam, 2012); and all other relevant information, for 
instance risk assessments (Uren v Corporate Leisure (UK) Ltd Ministry of Defence [2011] 
EWCA Civ 66) and, depending on the level at which the coach is operating, medical screening 
test results and records of progression reviews/meetings (i.e., Davenport v Farrow).  
 
More generally, as alluded to in the joint statement by the expert witnesses in Davenport 
v Farrow: (i) regular and approved coaching practices (i.e., advocated by a responsible coaching 
organisation/NGB; Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582); that 
are (ii) logically justifiable (Bolitho v City of Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232); and, 
(iii) suitable for the post or position of the coach (i.e., appropriate to the performance level in 
question; Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1987] QB 730), are hallmarks of reasonable 
coaching practice (Partington, 2014, 2015b).   When critically evaluating and reflecting upon 
their coaching practice, successfully satisfying these three legal propositions should safeguard 
coaches from negligence liability by means of a common practice or Bolam ‘defence’ 
(Partington, 2015b).  In short, coaches with the developed self-awareness to continuously 
evaluate the appropriateness of their coaching practice, and thereby successfully satisfy these 
propositions which are indicative of reasonable coaching, in addition to better protecting the 
safety and welfare of athletes, would be more likely to be shielded from negligence liability.   
 
Codes of Conduct 
In attempting to address many of the ethical (and legal) dilemmas encountered by 
coaches, there would appear to be an unexamined and superficial reliance by coaching 
organisations on codes of conduct (Hardman & Jones, 2013). Since the assumption seems to be 
that ethical considerations regarding coaching practice will be understood and grasped intuitively 
by coaches (Telfer, 2010), the extent to which codes of conduct impact and shape coaching 
behaviour appears open to conjecture and debate (Taylor & Garratt, 2010; Cassidy, 2013).  With 
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specific regard to the emerging interface between the law of negligence and sports coaching, this 
represents a significant missed opportunity given the qualified overlap between legal and ethical 
obligations (Mitten, 2013).  Put simply, the utility and beneficial impact of codes of conduct for 
coaches, in developing the awareness of legal duties and obligations, seems limited.  
Correspondingly, although informal or unofficial CPD can be advantageous as a means of coach 
development, it may conversely reinforce poor practice (Armour, 2010), or more precisely, 
negligent entrenched practice.   Significantly, Duffy et al. (2011) have recognised the importance 
of the need for the legal and ethical aspects of sport coaching to become more enhanced topics 
within the CPD provision of coaches, with evidence to indicate a demand from coaches for more 
training on health and safety issues, including risk management and (ir)responsible coaching 
(Stirling, Kerr & Cruz, 2012).  This article’s critical scrutiny of the implications for coaching 
practice of the interaction between sports coaching and the law of negligence endorses this view. 
 
Conclusion 
All coaches, regardless of their classification as amateur or professional, should have an 
informed awareness of the emerging relationship between sports coaching and the law of 
negligence.  This article’s interdisciplinary analysis of the legal liability of coaches, through a 
lens intended to better safeguard coaches from litigation risk, reinforces the responsibility of 
coaches to adopt objectively reasonable and justifiable coaching practices when interacting with 
athletes.  Although at first glance, this may appear to be a trite observation, this article has 
problematised coaching practice that may be informed by entrenched legitimacy, and ‘uncritical 
inertia’, by discussing a number of ethical dilemmas facing modern sports coaches.  Detailed 
scrutiny of two relevant court judgments further developed, unpacked and clarified this theme.  
Unexamined and superficial reliance on coaching codes of conduct fails to appropriately account 
for this developing and highly context-specific complexity of contemporary coaching.  Clearly, 
there is a requirement for NGBs and coaching associations to proactively support and develop 
coaches to ensure that they are appropriately protected from the evolving risk of liability in 
negligence (Partington, 2014).  Since an aim of relevant and engaging coach education courses 
should be to assist coaches in constructing (context-specific) knowledge, rather than merely 
receiving it (Nash, 2015), it is contended that discussion of relevant case law examples, for 
instance, Brady v Sunderland Association Football Club and Davenport v Farrow, would 
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provide coaches with instructive scenarios designed to stimulate critical reflection of legal and 
ethical issues.  In transcending some of the present limitations of codes of conduct, this should 
more effectively guide coaches in establishing an awareness and understanding of the dynamic 
legal context in which they discharge the duties incumbent upon them.  Further, since the 
guidelines provided by codes of conduct informs the ‘professional’ behaviour of coaches (Telfer, 
2010), fuller engagement with this issue may inform the professionalisation of sports coaching 
agenda.  More specifically, it is hoped that this article might engender further debate concerning 
the legal duties and obligations of coaches.  In addition to emphasising the safety and welfare of 
athletes, should the unfortunate need arise, this would correspondingly enable the coach’s acts or 
omissions to be more capable of withstanding robust and searching judicial scrutiny. 
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